The conflict by dint of kayoed Ali?s reign among himself and Muawiya was purportedly payable to his reluctance and decision non to find and visit Uthman?s killers, and indeed regarded as an indirect accomplice in the murder. This seemed to be comfortable precedent for Muawiya not to pay commitment to him, as it was his traffic as an Arab chieftain to avenge Uthman?s finish . and, historians such(prenominal) as Kennedy, tend to agree with the Shia view, ?treating this guide as a rac dishic pretext for his actions.? The Shia especially tends to get down and humiliate Muawiya, vilifying him for his op opinion to Ali out of sheer liking for agent and post . all the same Shia and Sunni historians tend to be biased on their views of Muawiya, thus diminishes their dependableness and proper judgement on his geek and rule. Sources and historic experience on his life and c beer are actually extraordinary and of his inner motives and purposes we know even less. commo n consensus among historians, although a simple one, states that the master(prenominal) reason behind Muawiya?s rebellion once mo simplicity Ali was requital for Uthman. While it may be comprehend as middling that, only a few defecate managed to delve deeper into the key reasons behind Muawiya?s actions. many traditionists such as al-Jurjani, Baladhuri and Awana bring a totally different outlook, eliminating Muawiya and economiseing that Amr b. al-As was the one who initiated and organized the tempestuousness and combats against Ali in Syria. Amr was a cheat political genius, who was as surface as behind the arbitration that deposed Ali, and thus possible that he was the brains behind Muawiya. Other views re-examine the revolt against Uthman. some(prenominal) reports impeach Muawiya of percept the imminent catastrophe and exploiting it for his own self-serving ends and ?began scheming and craved Uthman?s killing so as to succeed him as caliph? while proter ozoic(a)wises showed him in a favourable ro! ost ? removeing he came to Uthman?s appeals as short as he solidised how serious the situation was only was unspoiled too ripe. tally to Madelung, ?Uthman had meant teensy to him; he had through nothing to aid him and snarl no personal liability to search revenge.? From this evidence and Muawiya?s deliberate delay for Uthman?s appeals for help, it is thus conflicting with his reason for opposing Ali - blood vengeance; this was in fact a great ?political good? for his own secular ambitions and just a way to meet his Umayyad kinsmen who look to him for leadership and to rescind alienation. This claim is further back up since his launch for vengeance in Syria was only by and by the conflict of the Camel, sise months or more after Uthman?s murder. coincidently after the first civil war, which further stained Ali?s show as caliph, Muawiya needed that a Shura be set up for the purpose of nominating an untarnished caliph. If he was so keen to search revenge, why d id he wait that long? Instead, the difficult get he was in had spurred him into action. Ali had dismissed most of the provincial governors mention by his predecessor to reward his behaveers for their services however, Muawiya on the other hand had built a strong local force base in Syria and ref apply ?to be dismissed with ease or to stand by and see Uthman?s work undone.? at one time Ali?s presence in Iraq and Qays b. Sads fluid control of Egypt expose him and Syria to potential attack from two fronts. evening if Muawiya had accepted the nemesis of allegiance to Ali, Ali would have certainly used his authority to contract him from his position as governor of Syria; so might as well not give his allegiance and use the demand for blood vengeance as a tool to berate rebellion against Ali and secure his h old on Syria. Thus he stepped up his propaganda against Ali and hoped to draw the governor of Egypt to his side, by threats and promises. His purpose to carry on in great business office alternatively then genuinel! y desire revenge for Uthman reflects his inconsiderate character and his unlawful tactics against Ali swear his position as one of personal gain. Keeping to that point, ?It has been suggested that the competitor amidst Ali and Muawiya entailed some item of territorial competition between Iraq and Syria.? This suggestion was supported by Hitti, stating ?The issue however, was more than a personal one; it transcended idiosyncratic and even family affairs. The real incredulity was whether Kufa or Damascus, Iraq or Syria, should be supreme in Islamic affairs.? A victory for Muawiya?s army would mean Syrian domination over the rest of the empire, supporting his claim for caliphate and again another example of his lust for power. Some historians state the real aim of Muawiyah was to create difficulties in the way of Ali in exhibition to pave the way for the im fractionation of power to the Umayyads. The conflict between Ali and Muawiyah was really the recurrence of the old ri valry between the Hashimites and the Umayyads, who ?believed that the caliphate had through Uthman be mystify ?their property?.? withal this aim was unlikely the main reason of conflict hardly alternatively served as an bonus for the members of each clan to fight. once again power always seems to be the motive; the new Arab cultivation the Prophet had strived for is gradually retroversion back to their old Bedouin ways. some other reason for Muawiya?s resistivity against Ali was the effects it would have if he had paid allegiance. As stated by Humphreys: ?the acknowledgment that Ali had come to power in a ripeful manner, that there were no other legitimate claimants for the station of caliph?? Muawiya could not leave for these effects to take practise, as he will much lose all his power and status. In fact, Ali?s battle to caliph lacked legitimacy. Although his close family relationship with the Prophet and merits for Islam seemed enough for his claim, ?He was not chosen by a Shura, which Umar had stipulated as a co! ndition for valid succession.? but doubts surround whether his attitude towards Uthman?s murder permit him to fill the caliphate. Despite that, throughout the conflict of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, Muawiya had ?make no claims of his own? until later on, concentrating initiative on his position as governor of Syria and waiting until Ali compromised himself by his conduct before interfere in the course of events . Muawiya had no claim or the support needed to aspire for the caliphate and his status as a late and ?convenient? convert without early merit in Islam did not help him. The disintegration of Ali?s caliphate was then ascribed to ?Kharijite opposition preferably to his activities, which was sacredly unlawful? although he was the one who started the chain reaction which led to these events. His vengeance for Uthman and determination to check his governorship led to the Battle of Siffin, which led to the arbitration, which shortened Ali?s position and then Muawiya ?openly asserted his claims to the caliphate.? All the right pieces had suitably fell into place to strengthen his claim to the caliphate and congratulations has to be given to him for his political shrewdness, moderation and self-control. There is little diachronic evidence to subsume Muawiya with the deaths of Hassan and Husayn. Although Muawiya had made a financial agreement with Hassan not to claim his caliphate, people today, mainly Shia, solace implicate him with his death, claiming that he was ? possibly toxicanted because of some harem intrigue.? Some early Arab historians believe that Muawiya made many plans and arrangements to kill Hassan . It was tell that he secretly contacted Hassan?s wife Ja?da bint al-Ash?arh ibn Qays and instigated her to poison her husband, promising gold and mating to Yazid in return . However it is unlikely that Muawiya would benefit in any way by killing Hassan. Hassan proved to be no threat to his caliphate and had no political involvement at all. Because of the lack of substantia! l evidence, it is caoutchouc to conclude that Hassan?s death was not connected to Muawiya?s personal motives against Ali. The same could be said for Husayn?s death; Muawiya had already passed absent and the focus has shifted to his son, Yazid I. Some weak sources claim that Muawiya had promised Husayn the Caliphate after his death.
Here, it can only be assumed that he cherished to keep the power in his family and the Umayyads, and it?s possible that there might still be some personal blood feud against Ali, thus he went back on his word and set up the price of admission of his son, Yazid I and indirectly played a give out in Husayn?s death. Muawiya?s nomination of Yazid caused a stir in the Muslim community, those opposing the plan, quickly ? incriminate Muawiya of attempting to set up a hereditary monarchy.? It also brought some speculation of Muawiya?s Islamic dedicate and its ideals. However, he credibly realised the flaws of a democratic caliphate and sensed that a monarchy would be the best way forward for the Muslims, considering the fact that the Arabs supported the conceit during the issue of succession of the Prophet in the case of Ali. Armstrong though states that he ?depart from Arab traditions in order to secure the succession.? Weiss and meter rebuke this statement, believing that ?even in this matter Muawiya showed obedience to Arab sensitivities. Rather than imposing the dynastic principle upon tribal leaders, he secured from them an oath of allegiance for his son, thus basing the succession upon their consent rather than upon any legitimate right of his househ old.? The principle of succession by election was th! ereby honored, while the caliphate actually passed from father to son. Muawiya had insert a loophole though this system and consequently created a agent for a de facto dynasty. But considering Yazid?s character, ?an absolute playboy? , the spectral quality of the caliph has taken a back lavatory to the politics, therefore also reflecting Muawiya?s religious grounding and proves that his intentions were to keep the Umayyads in power. Muawiya?s actions throughout his career demonstrate that ?his virtues were those of the victorious politician, not of the brilliant general or the religious leader.? virtually historians, such as Kennedy, Armstrong, and Peterson etc. agree that Muawiya was problematic in religious context, stating that he is far from ideal and ? conscientiously pitiable? . According to Humphreys, ?In formal piety and personal conduct, he was acceptable enough (at least he provoked no public scandal) but he was never regarded as religiously learned or even thoughtful and engaged, beyond a superficial level. He believed in God and was publicly coiffure in his observances but no more.? His lack of Islamic send could be confirmed in his actions and decisions. Religiously unlawful activities and hit methods of gaining power and status against Ali establish his disregard and failure to bear to simple Islamic principles, ideals, the Quran and Hadith. In conclusion, although Muawiya was a conformation of the conflicts and anxieties that afflicted the Ummah, he is decisive political figure in the history of Islam. Muawiya was ?literally the only man with political and soldiers resources available to restore unity? , despite lacking a religious moral ground. Even though he restored peace, he had deliberately provoked and been a major protagonist in the civil war that disunited them in the first place. Whilst historical evidence on his personal thoughts and intentions are not solid, it is homey though that his ascension to caliph a nd power was ultimately part due to his own machinat! ions. Bibliography:1.Armstrong, Karen, Islam: A Short muniment, Phoenix Press, London, 20022.Hawting, G. R., The wit of al-Tabari Volume XVII The First Civil War, New York Press, USA, 19963.Hitti, Phillip K., register of the Arabs, Macmillan, New York, 20024.Humphreys, Stephen R., Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan ? From Arabia to Empire, Oneworld Pubns Ltd, 20065.Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain, 20046.Madelung, Wilferd, The fetching over to Muhammad ? A Study of primeval Caliphate7.Petersen, Erling Ladewig, Ali and Muawiya in Early Arabic Tradition, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 19648.Weiss, Bernard G. and Green, Arnold H., A Survey of Arab history, Cairo, Cairo Press, Amer. Univ., 1990 i mustiness say, this essay is very good overall. Has many sources to back up the author and also has looked at the situation from both sides. If you motivation to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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